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Introduction 
The investigations on the London attacks of 7 
July 2005 have yet to clarify the intricate 
storyline of the bombings. Yet, the European 
Union has already set about tightening up its 
fight against international terrorism through 
policies that, unfortunately, compound the 
difficulty of addressing the challenge. The 
problems arise partly because the policies put 
forward do not match the diagnosis nor do 
they fully comply with the principles of 
legitimacy, proportionality and efficiency. In 
addition, it is unclear how these Community 
measures will minimise the lack of trust 
among member states, which has put the 
brakes on the implementation of instruments 
adopted after the Madrid attacks. This relates 
to the vexed question of the extent to which 
intergovernmental initiatives such as the 
Prüm Treaty are compatible with a credible 
EU policy in the area of terrorism.
1 
This Policy Brief proceeds in two sections: 
First, we critically examine the main EU 
measures and legislative initiatives intending 
to fight what has been qualified as ‘terrorism’ 
following the Declaration on the EU 
Response to the London Bombings,  as 
adopted by the Council on Wednesday, 13 
July 2005. Second, we investigate how, if the 
freedom and justice dimensions are not set at 
the centre of EU policies developing an Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice, human rights 
and civil liberties can be endangered and 
finally lost to the exceptional security demands. 
* Thierry Balzacq and Sergio Carrera are Research 
Fellows at CEPS. 
1 The Treaty of Prüm (Schengen III), increasing cross-
border cooperation in the fight against terrorism, 
organized crime and illegal immigration, is an 
intergovernmental initiative signed on 27 May 2005 in 
Prüm (Germany) (retrieved from www.mir.es). 
The EU’s response to the London events 
The logic behind the EU’s answers to terrorism is now 
well known. It always serves two purposes, the first of 
which is psychological and the second being more 
operational. The psychological part of the European 
Security Strategy is a reassuring action, the aim of 
which is to reinvigorate and strengthen the bonds 
among member states. It is one of the EU’s roles to 
promote solidarity and empathy among the member 
states in such difficult circumstances. In this light, the 
Council meeting on 13 July 2005 following the London 
bombings was vital. Indeed, by bringing together the 
interior and justice ministries of the member states, it 
has reasserted the importance of a collective strategy 
against the terrorist threat.  
The EU operational answer, on the other hand, is 
geared to defensive and proactive political actions. It is 
often encapsulated in a set of legislative initiatives. The 
extraordinary meeting of the Council falls within this 
scope. It intended to speed up transnational cooperation 
through a package of security measures that are part of 
the EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism. The 
Council has declared “its immediate priority to build on 
the existing strong EU framework for pursuing and 
investigating terrorists across borders, in order to 
impede terrorists’ planning, disrupt supporting 
networks, cut off any funding and bringing terrorists to 
justice”.
2 
It is important, however, to bear in mind that many of 
the legislative tools and initiatives included in the 
Council Declaration that came out of the extraordinary 
meeting are neither new nor innovative in character. 
Indeed, some of the ‘sticks’ thereby highlighted had 
already been included in the European security agenda 
before the attacks on 11 September in New York and 
on 11 March in Madrid. They were furthermore 
integrated in and promoted by the Declaration on 
                                                 
2 Council Declaration on the EU Response to the London 
Bombings, Extraordinary Council Meeting, Justice and 
Home Affairs, Council of the European Union, 11116/05, 
Brussels, 13 July 2005. 
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Combating Terrorism of 25 March 2004. These 
initiatives are, for instance, commitments to: combat 
terrorism financing, improve information-sharing 
between security and law enforcement agencies, 
intensify the exchange of police and judicial 
information, protect citizens and infrastructures (with 
the use of new technologies, e.g. biometrics and 
databases), and manage and reduce the consequences 
of acts of political violence. 
In addition to the much-debated proposal on the 
retention and storage of telecommunications data,
3 the 
Council would like to agree on the following items by 
December 2005: the European Evidence Warrant; the 
exchange of information between law enforcement 
authorities; the exchange of information concerning 
terrorist offences; a code of conduct to prevent the 
misuse of charities by terrorists; and, a strategy to 
address factors that contribute to the radicalisation and 
recruitment of terrorist activists among ‘home-grown’ 
groups. 
The problem, however, is that a substantial portion of 
these policies are open to discussion. Further, there 
seems to be a lack of relevance. Indeed, the order of 
priorities is not consistent with the diagnosis 
established after the London bombings. Although the 
investigations are far from being completed, the first 
clues are leaning towards home-grown groups of 
radical individuals. Given this finding, one might have 
thought that the Council meeting would firmly address 
the driving reasons behind radicalisation. Yet, in fact, 
when it comes to measures proposed to prevent “people 
turning to terrorism”,
4 the EU strategy remains 
somewhat truncated. Instead, most of the measures 
advocate the “roll-out of biometric identifiers”,
5 
information-sharing, the re-introduction of internal 
border checks, the reinforcing of external border 
controls, the retention of telecommunications data, the 
expeditious implementation of the European Evidence 
Warrant and the like.
6 We are not claiming that these 
measures are wholly useless. Rather we think that they 
do not tackle the root factors leading to violence nor do 
they address the many ways in which activists are 
                                                 
3 Draft Framework Decision 2004/8958 of 28 April 2004 on 
the retention of data processed and stored in connection with 
the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or data on public communications 
networks for the purpose of prevention, investigation, 
detection and prosecution of crime and criminal offences 
including terrorism, Council of the European Union, 
Brussels. 
4 See the Council Declaration on the EU Response to the 
London Bombings, op. cit. point 4. 
5 Ibid., point 6. 
6 J. Apap & S. Carrera, “Maintaining Security Within 
Borders: Toward a Permanent State of Emergency in the 
EU?”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No. 4, 
October 2004, pp. 399-416. 
recruited. Furthermore, the Council Declaration, as 
with former EU strategies seeking to tackle 
‘international terrorism’, creates more problems and 
individual insecurity, than it solves.
7 Taking the 
argument further, we analyse how and why this is the 
case, then we suggest ways to circumvent the problem. 
Limitations of EU policies against ‘terrorism’ 
The security strategy revitalised by the Council 
Declaration on the EU Response to the London 
Bombings of 13 July 2005 hardly passes the tests of 
legitimacy, proportionality and effectiveness. It also 
shows the existence of a lack of mutual confidence and 
a high level of mistrust among EU counterparts 
regarding cooperation on security and justice. 
1. The test of legitimacy and the rule of law 
Few would disagree that this package does not fully 
comply with Art. 8 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
8 the right 
to privacy and data protection as guaranteed by the 
Council Directive 95/46 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data
9 and ‘liberty’ in general.  
Protection of the individual and liberty should be at the 
heart of any security measure being developed. Legal 
and judicial remedies for the individuals affected or 
potentially subject to these measures should also be put 
in place as a priority. The lack of political agreement 
within the Council of Ministers on the proposal for a 
framework decision on certain procedural rights of 
‘suspected terrorists’ in criminal proceedings 
throughout the EU reveals member states’ hesitation 
towards having ‘more Europe’ in the freedom 
dimension.
10  
                                                 
7 D. Bigo & S. Carrera, “From New York to Madrid: 
Technology as the Ultra-Solution to the Permanent State of 
Fear and Emergency in the EU”, Commentary, CEPS, 
Brussels, April 2004. 
8 Art. 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms states that “1. Everyone has the right 
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or 
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
9 European Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 
Official Journal L 281, 23 December 1995, pp. 0031-50. 
10 Proposal for a Framework Decision on certain procedural 
rights in criminal proceedings through the European Union, 
COM(2004) 328 final, 28 April 2004.  THE EU’S FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM| 3 
 
The main risk is that the principle of legitimacy and the 
rule of law are endangered by the very legal framework 
under which measures crafted to ‘fight terrorism’ are 
being adopted – the EU third pillar.
11 Indeed, any 
cooperation in these fields continues to be carried out 
on a purely intergovernmental basis, falling outside the 
Community method.
12 This has the negative 
consequence of preventing a direct and transparent 
involvement of the European Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice. Yet the European 
Parliament should be openly included in the decision-
making procedures to guarantee the democratic 
accountability of the legal instruments being adopted 
and implemented. The role of the European Court of 
Justice should be strengthened to ensure judicial review 
and the protection of the rule of law. Indeed, the 
involvement of the judiciary is of utmost importance if 
we want to protect our democratic values and the 
individual. 
2. The test of proportionality 
It is held that any security instrument adopted should 
be assessed through the lens of the principle of 
proportionality. This principle is grounded upon two 
assumptions. First, the European Community acts only 
when it is necessary or ‘required’ to do so in order to 
achieve a certain end. This entails the idea of a 
balanced relationship between means and ends. 
Second, and more importantly, it requires that the 
measures adopted are the least restrictive to freedom. 
In this light, are the security measures proposed 
compatible with this general principle of EC law?  
The answer may take the following form: Some of the 
legal acts proposed by the British government and the 
special Council meeting have been put into question by 
the European Parliament, civil society, NGOs and 
academia because of serious concerns as regards their 
compliance with the principle of proportionality and 
the human rights dimension (as provided by 
international and European human rights 
commitments). For instance, the proposal on the 
retention and storage of telecommunications data was 
cast out by the European Parliament on 18 April 2005. 
This initiative had previously been presented on 28 
April 2004 by France, Ireland, Sweden and the UK.
13  
                                                 
11 Title VI of the Treaty on European Union, Provisions on 
Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, Arts. 
29-43. 
12 See T. Balzacq & S. Carrera, Migration, Borders and 
Asylum: Trends and Vulnerabilities in EU Policy, CEPS, 
Brussels, July 2005. 
13 Draft Framework Decision 8958/2004 of 28 April 2004 on 
the retention of data processed and stored in connection with 
the provision of publicly available electronic 
communications services or data on public communications 
networks for the purpose of prevention, investigation, 
The main reasons the European Parliament justified its 
rejection of the proposal were: 
¾  the choice of legal basis, being Art. 31 of the 
Treaty on European Union, which deals with 
“common action on judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters” and which would fall within the 
rubric of ‘justice’ under The Hague Programme 
agreed in November 2004. The proposal consists of 
various measures that come under both the third 
and the first pillars of the Union. Notably, the 
establishment of an obligation for service providers 
to retain data, the definition of data and the 
retention period fall within the first 
pillar/Community law; 
¾  inappropriateness in view of the principle of 
proportionality. As the Parliament’s report puts it, 
“the ends do not justify the means, as the measures 
are neither appropriate nor necessary and are 
unreasonably harsh towards those concerned”, and 
that “given the volume of data to be retained, 
particularly internet data, it is unlikely that an 
appropriate analysis of the data will be at all 
possible”;
14 and 
¾  incompatibility with Art. 8 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights, which guarantees 
the right of respect for private life against 
interference by a public authority. 
Independent of the Parliament’s report and several 
criticisms questioning this particular initiative, the 
above-mentioned extraordinary Council Meeting of 13 
July 2005 has reintroduced it into the policy agenda. 
Even worse, this and other security initiatives inserted 
in the Council’s Declaration on the EU Response to the 
London Bombings are currently under scrutiny at the 
national level. This is the case in the UK, where the 
House of Lords EU Select Committee has expressed its 
concerns to the government that as they stand these 
measures are theoretically dangerous to adopt. These 
developments are disturbing. They lead to the 
impression that contested acts are being introduced 
through the back door during critical times, without 
consideration for due legislative process, national-level 
 
                                                                                   
detection and prosecution of crime and criminal offences 
including terrorism. 
14 See European Parliament, Draft Legislative Resolution on 
the on the initiative by the French Republic, Ireland, the 
Kingdom of Sweden and the United Kingdom for Draft 
Framework Decision 8958/2004 of 28 April 2004 on the 
retention of data processed and stored in connection with the 
provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or data on public communications networks for the 
purpose of prevention, investigation, detection and 
prosecution of crime and criminal offences including 
terrorism, 8958/2004 – C6-0198/2004 – 2004/0813(CNS), 
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scrutiny procedures and irregardless of whether they 
address – proportionally and effectively – the challenge 
posed.  
3. The test of effectiveness  
Scepticism persists over whether these legal 
instruments are effective in curbing threats of political 
violence. Moreover, the political struggle taking place 
in order to ensure that the intergovernmental method of 
cooperation reigns over policies on security 
undermines the efficacy and effectiveness of the acts 
themselves. As we have seen above, the EU’s third 
pillar has three weaknesses: 1) it is based on the 
unanimity rule; 2) it excludes the European Parliament 
and the European Court of Justice; and 3) it introduces 
a lack of transparency in the decision-making process. 
The efficiency and overall usefulness of the operational 
setting is, as a consequence, sapped.  
A good example showing the predominance of the 
intergovernmental method of cooperation in the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime is the Treaty of 
Prüm or Schengen III, signed between seven EU 
member states (Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Austria and Luxembourg) on 27 May 
2005. This Treaty aims at reinforcing transnational 
cooperation against organised crime, terrorism and 
illegal immigration while setting aside the European 
Community framework. The Treaty of Prüm thus 
proposes to cement the interchange of information 
between the law enforcement and security agencies of 
the signatories. It widens the power of these security 
agencies (through the creation of national contact 
points being appointed in accordance with national 
law) to have direct and automatic access to DNA and 
fingerprint data in another participating member state 
in order to prevent ‘terrorist attacks’. 
This Treaty is not the only intergovernmental plan 
being discussed. On 6 March 2004, members of the G5 
(France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) agreed that 
they will set up a network for exchanging information 
on individuals linked to terrorist activities. The 
database will contain information on fingerprints, DNA 
and false identity details.
15  
The picture that emerges is one of dispersed policies in 
the field of terrorism, and consequently ‘less Europe’. 
The danger is to turn the EU into a shadow body that 
legitimises instruments ratified by certain of its 
members, on different occasions, within different 
settings. The communitarisation of this cooperation 
(bringing it under the Community method) and the use 
of the co-decision procedure (Art. 251 EC Treaty) 
 
                                                 
15 The G5 meeting called for more data-sharing to fight 
terrorism in Europe (retrieved from http://europa.eu.int/ 
idabc/). 
would alleviate these weaknesses. It would also ensure 
the parliamentary and judicial accountability of the 
policy steps taken. 
4. The test of mutual confidence 
EU cooperation in security and justice dimensions is a 
case in point of the mistrust that endures among law 
enforcement and security agencies, as well as the 
judicial authorities in the EU. This is mainly ascribable 
to the different legal and historical traditions, visions 
and philosophies of each of the member states of the 
EU project. Trust is essential for maintaining stable 
relationships, and it is particularly vital for effective 
cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. The 
establishment of a high level of trust is closely 
intertwined with the progressive establishment of an 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
The European Arrest Warrant (EAW) represents one of 
the first legal instruments implementing the principle 
of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters 
formally adopted by the Council.
16  It has, however, 
shown the persisting lack of mutual confidence about 
member states’ intentions and respective judicial/legal 
systems.
17 The deep difficulties that surfaced during the 
implementation processes at the national level have 
greatly mined the efficiency and credibility of the 
regime. Lack of trust, or rather clear proof of mistrust 
seems to be a pervasive factor of the whole debate. The 
legal challenge brought by Germany and Poland before 
their respective Constitutional Courts questioning its 
compatibility with their constitutional legal settings 
also gives more strength to that argument. More 
worryingly, on 18 July 2005 the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany ruled the act implementing the EAW 
into German law as void. This judgement seriously 
questions, and provokes a rethink about, the very 
pillars of European cooperation in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice.
18 
Conclusions 
How possible is it to adopt robust policies against 
‘terrorism’, while maintaining a commitment to civil 
liberties and human right standards? How possible is it 
to set up policies that do not concede arguments to 
                                                 
16 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 
2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, Official Journal L 190, 
18.07.2002. 
17 J. Apap & S. Carrera, Judicial Cooperation and the 
European Arrest Warrant – A Good Testing Ground for 
Mutual Recognition in an Enlarged EU?, Policy Brief No. 
46, CEPS, Brussels, February 2004. 
18 The implications of this new legal challenge are far 
reaching and fall beyond the scope of this Policy Brief. We 
intend, however, to analyse them in a forthcoming CEPS 
working document.  THE EU’S FIGHT AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM| 5 
 
activists? These are the challenges that the EU faces 
today. The London attacks have made them more 
acute. Let us propose a way to begin framing a policy 
that addresses terrorism effectively. 
First, the measures adopted should match the diagnosis. 
Biometric IDs, the exchange of DNA, EU-wide 
databases, the reintroduction of internal border checks, 
the reinforcement of external border controls
19 and the 
European Evidence Warrant would have been of no 
help in preventing London events from occurring. 
Arguments to the contrary would be dishonest.  
By contrast, a policy of recognition (equal treatment) 
and  integration (social inclusion), not only of 
tolerance, would have probably made a significant 
difference. This may prove more difficult if more 
rewarding than enacting new coercive rules. The EU 
needs, therefore, to rethink its discourse and overall 
approach towards groups of its citizens (and non-
citizens) who are of different racial and religious 
backgrounds. This, we know, is complicated. Policies 
on integration and social inclusion are still largely the 
preserve of local authorities under the national level. 
The question then arises as to how the EU could have a 
real impact in these fields. Whatever forms these 
policies might take at national level, we believe that the 
EU can at least ensure their compliance with equal 
treatment and non-discrimination. 
Further, although some may argue that the young 
bombers in London were all ‘well-integrated’, the 
government attempts to de-politicise these acts of 
violence are irresponsible. This stance only makes 
sense in view of a stubborn refusal by certain member 
states to see any link between domestic radicalisation 
and their international activities.
20 To close this 
window of vulnerability, the EU should therefore seek 
out the political message behind these attacks and 
consult with member states in order to uproot the 
threat. This is even more urgent if the bombings are 
carried out by those for whom religion and politics are 
intertwined. 
Second, the policies adopted should not be 
disconnected from the rule of law. They should rather 
start from and be embedded in the rule of law. This is 
the precondition for their having a democratic nature 
and judicial accountability. 
                                                 
19 See for instance the Commission’s Proposal for a Council 
Decision on the improvement of police cooperation between 
the Member States of the European Union, especially at the 
internal borders and amending the Convention implementing 
the Schengen Agreement, COM(2005) 317, 18.7.2005. 
20 On the UK’s performance in the war on terrorism see the 
Briefing Paper on Security, Terrorism and the UK, Chatham 
House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 18 
July 2005. 
Third, the European Parliament represents EU citizens 
and reflects the values and principles of contemporary 
liberal democracies. Thus its position on any policy 
affecting the lives of EU citizens should be valued and 
indeed take precedence. This, we believe, will enhance 
transparency and safeguard the legitimacy of 
legislations agreed upon by member states. 
Finally, a Community approach to terrorism should be 
given preference over intergovernmental actions that 
seem to compete with the EU level. Terrorism is 
already too complex a problem to tackle; matters 
related to it should be dealt with in a coherent 
institutional setting. Too many institutions and 
agencies along with too many initiatives will blur the 
policies adopted and affect their efficient 
implementation. The direct result is a more vulnerable 
EU. 
Many would have us believe that the seriousness of the 
threat justifies ‘exceptional measures’ that are neither 
proportionate nor in compliance with human rights and 
civil liberties commitments. This is a perilous posture 
for liberal democracies. In fact, the trouble is that 
measures promoted by the last extraordinary Council 
meeting may, if not checked carefully, undermine the 
values that the EU considers crucial to its identity. 
This, without doubt, will be a serious policy failure – 
perhaps more serious than the terrorist threat itself 
because it will fundamentally vitiate the very idea of 
the EU as a distinctive Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. 
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